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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
There is an action resulting from a Denial of a Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court denied a petition for a Writ of Mandamus 
to compel Murray City Court to forward to the District Court the 
transcript of a Small Claims Court proceeding on appeal. Thereaft 
the Appellant filed a motion to the District Court under Rule 59 
(e) of the U.R.C.P. to alter or amend the Judgment. This Motion 
was denied by the District Court. From the order denying 
plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, the plaintiff appea 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming the 
decision of the District Court in all respects. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 21, 1977 in the Small Claims Court of Murray City 
a hearing was held on the matter of the State of Utah v. Rose 
Marie Hume. On May 2nd, 1977, Judge L. H. Griffiths of the Small 
Claims Murray Court found in favor of the Plaintiff, State of 
Utah, and awarded Judgment against the Appellant in the amount 
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of $175.00 plus $8.00 Court Costs. On this date Respond~ 
Court Clerk mailed the Notice of Judgment to Appellant. y 
on the 7th day of July, 1977, the Appellant filed a Notice 
Appeal in the Third District Court appealing the Judgment 
Small Claims Court of Murray City. Thereafter, on July 1i 
the Respondent Court Clerk sent a Notice to Appellant thu 
would not forward the Notice of Appeal to the Third Distri 
Court for the reason that it had not been timely filed. 
On August 16, 1977, the Appellant then filed a peti 
the Third District Court for a Writ of Mandamus to compel 
respondent Court Clerk to forward the transcript of the fi 
the case State of Utah vs. Rose Marie Hume to the Distrid 
for appeal. On October 14, 1977, the District Court, afb 
hearing on the matter, entered its order denying the petU 
Motion for a Writ of Mandamu9 and ruled that the time hr 
from the Murray City Small Claims Court obviously had elaJ 
October 31, 1977, the Appellant then filed a Motion to AU 
Judgment pursuant to Rule 59 (e) of the Utah Rules of C~ 
Procedure. This Motion was also denied by the District0 
Order entered December 22, 1977, ruling that the Appellan! 
was not a proper procedure for the Appellant to pursue. 
the Appellant filed its Notice of Appeal to the Utah St~ 
Supreme Court form the Order of the District Court enteff 
December 22, 1977. 
- 2 -
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SOLE ISSUE PRESENTLY BEFORE THIS COURT IS WHETHER RULE 59 (e) 
IS THE PROPER PROCEDURE TO USE TO SECURE REVIEW OF THE ORDER DENYIN< 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS. 
Appellant in its brief cites several ''Questions to be 
Decided". However, the first question cited by Appellant is the 
sole question at issue before this Court. The Notice of Appeal 
filed by Appellant states that she was appealing to this Court 
from the District Court's order denying Petitioner's Motion to 
Alter Judgment, dated December 21, 1977. This Order, entered 
December 22, 1977, stated simply that the Appellant's Motion to 
Alter Judgment was not the proper procedure for the Appellant to 
pursue and therefore denied the Motion. 
Appellant proposes that several other issues or questions 
need to be decided by this Court. However, all of the other 
questions together with the substantial documentation and 
argument cited in connection therewith go to the merits of 
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Mandamus. None of the issues 
discussed therein concern the availability of the Rule 59 (e) 
procedure to secure review of the District Court Order denying 
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Mandamus. 
Therefore the only question before this Court is the 
- 3 -
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propriety of the use of the Rule 59 (e) Motion to secure n 
of the District Court's previous order and all other arg~ 
contained in Appellant's brief are superfluous and not in 
I 
POINT I I 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY IN DENYING APPELLAr 
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT. 
POINT A 
RULE 59 (e) OF THE U.R.C.P., IS NOT AVAILABLE ASM 
TO ALLOW AGGRIEVED PARTIES TO REARGUE THE SAME ISSUES ARGl 
PRIOR HEARINGS IN THE SAME COURT. 
The Appellant in her Motion to Alter or Amend Judgi 
not introduce any new issues, evidence or argument that ht 
been introduced at the prior hearing ort her Petition forl 
Mandamus. In filing the Motion to Alter or Amend the Ju~i 
all that the Appellant had actually done was to ask the C 
a Motion for a Rehearing to reconsider an unfavorable rul 
a prior motion. 
This Court has had occasion to rule directly on* 
Reconsider. In Utah State Employees Credit Union v. An2 
Riding, 469 P.2d 1, 24 Utah 2d 211, the aggrieved Deh~ 
filed a Motion to Reconsider the Court's previous ruling. 
Court in discussing this issue stated, "We are unaware of 
- 4 -
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such motion under our rules," and stated further that "The 
motion to reconsider . . . the judgment is abortive under our 
Rules." Riding at P.2. 
The Supreme Court of the State of California has also had 
opportunity to rule on precisely this same issue. In the case 
Farrar v. McCormick 25 Cal. App 3d 706, 102 Cal Rptr 190 (1972), 
the Court acknowledged that there was also no such rule or other 
authority for such a motion in the California jurisdiction by 
stating as follows: 
We now weigh plaintiff's appeal from the order denying 
his Motion to Reconsider. No statutory or other 
authority exists for a bare "Motion to Reconsider." 
"Here so far as can be told, Plaintiff merely renewed 
his previous opposition to defend its motion to 
dismiss, asking the Court to think about its ruling 
once again." Farrar at P.193. 
Such is precisely the case now before this Court. All the 
Appellant tried to achieve through the Rule 59 (e) Motion was to 
simply ask the Court to think about its ruling once more, 
presenting no new evidence, facts or issues to be decided by the 
Court. 
Appellant cites several cases as authority for allowing 
the use of the 59 (e) Motion to allow her to have a second chance 
to argue her Motion. However, her cases can be easily 
distinguished from the instant case. In the case cited by the 
Appellant, Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976), the 
Appellant had filed the 59 (e) Motion in an effort to have the 
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Court amend an order rendered some seven months prior whici 
missed the Plaintiff's complaint and to allow the Appellant 
file an amended Complaint. That case is different from t~ 
instant case in that in Nichols the Appellant was seeking· 
amend the Judgment entered by the District Court previous~ 
to allow them to introduce new issues raised in an Amended 
This then lead to this Court's conclusion that "after an o: 
of dismissal, the Plaintiff must move under rules 59 (e) o: 
to reopen the Judgment." Nichols at P.232. The purposei: 
amending the Judgment, however, would have been to allowN 
to file an Amended Complaint. 
The Appellant also cites the cases of Spatz v. Masc 
368 F Supp. 352 and Gainey v. Brotherhood of Railroad and 
Clerks, 303 F. 2d 716, as further authority to allow theu 
the Rule 59 (e) Motion. Both of those cases, however, wer 
decided by a Federal Court applying the local procedural r 
which in those cases, were the Pennsylvania Rules of Proce 
which allow Motions for Reconsideration and Reargument. ! 
Court in both of these cases held in affect that since t~ 
Pennsylvania local rules allowed a "Motion for Reconsider! 
Reargument" they would construe the Federal Rule 59 (e) tc 
substantially the same rule. This argument, however, co~ 
work in this jurisdiction, where this Court was held in tl 
case that there simply is no Motion to Reconsider or Re~ 
a case in this jurisdiction. 
- 6 -
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POINT B 
THE RULE 59 (e) MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT SHOULD 
BE USED ONLY TO ALTER OR AMEND A JUDGMENT, NOT TO APPEAL A 
JUDGMENT. 
This Court is urged to adopt an interpretation of the Rule 
59 (e) Motion that it should be used only to Alter or Amend a 
Judgment, exactly as the rule reads in the Rules of Civil Procedure 
It should not be used as a method of appeal from a judgment of the 
District Court. That authority lies within the sole province of 
this Court. Rule 59 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
identical to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and therefore 
discussions in Federal jurisdictions considering Rule 59 (e) are 
demonstrative of the interpretation which this Court is urged to 
place upon the Rule 59 (e) Motion. 
The Federal District Court of Ohio arrived at exactly the 
conclusion urged upon this Court in Erickson Tool Co. v. Balas 
Collet Co., 277 F Supp 266 (D.C. Ohio, 1967). 
Plaintiff has also moved pursuant to rule 59 (e) 
of the Federal Rules of Procedure for alteration 
or amendment of the Court's Judgment. Plaintiff 
has not set out the alterations or amendments it 
desires. It appears, however, from a glance at the 
motion and from the arguments contained in the brief 
of counsel accompanying the motion, that Plaintiff 
is presenting substantially the same contentions 
that were made in support of its Rule 52 (b) Motion, 
and that Plaintiff is seeking a complete reversal 
of the Court's judgment. Such is not the purpose 
of the Rules relied upon. Erickson at P. 234. 
- 7 -
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Based upon this argument, the Ohio District Court 
denied the Plaintiff's motion for alteration or amendment 
judgment. 
From this case emerge two principles concerning tl 
Rule 59 (e) Motion. First, it should not be used to si~ 
reargue substantially the same contentions that are made 
earlier motion. Second, that the 59 (e) Motion should bt 
only to Alter or Amend the judgment, not to appeal a pre1 
ruling. Sound public policy cert•inly dictates that suci 
interpretation of the Rules should be adopted by this Cm 
multiplicity of problems arise if this Court were to al1 
Rule 59 (e) Motion to be used simply to reargue the same 
second time. This Court should give finality to the Di~ 
Court's decisions and thereby prevent a substantial wasb 
District Courts' time by requiring them to hear twice ev1 
made and ruled upon. Therefore, this Court is urged toi 
rule that the Rule 59 (e) Motion is to be used to Alter: 
a judgment not to appeal from one. 
- 8 -
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POINT III 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THE RIGHT TO HAVE THE DISTRICT COURT 
CONSIDER A RULE 59 (e) MOTION, SUCH AN ORDER IS NOT REVIEWABLE BY 
THIS COURT WHERE THERE IS NO ASSERTION OR SHOWING OF AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION OF THE DISTRICT COURT. 
Assuming arguendo that this Court were to hold that the 
Rule 59 (e) Motion was available to the Appellant to secure review 
of the District Court's previous ruling, this Court cannot review 
the district Court's decision denying appellant's Motion to Alter 
or Amend without a showing or at least an assertion that there was 
an abuse of discretioR by the District Court. The various State 
Supreme Courts and the Federal Courts throughout the country have 
had countless oppdrtunities to rule on Rule 59 (a) Motions for 
New Trial. These Courts have uniformly held that orders denying 
motions for new trial are not reviewable when the trial judge's 
discretion is exercised in accordance with accepted legal standards 
Meehan v. Gulf Oil Corp, (C.A. Penn. 1963) 312 F. 2d 737. All 
Federal Courts are in accord that, "a Motion for New Trial is 
addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and 
its action thereon will not be disturbed on appeal unless such 
action constitutes a manifest abuse of discretion." Trapp v. U.S. 
(C.A. Oklahoma, 1949) 177 F.2d 1. 
In determing whether or not there has been an abuse of 
- 9 -
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~-· 
discretion, the Courts have outlined certain guidelines. 
Abuse of discretion in granting or denying a new 
trial is ordinarly established by a showing that 
the new trial court acted without authority, for an 
erroneous reason, or arbitrarily and without 
justification in the light of all the circumstances 
as shown by review of the record as a whole. Sommen 
v. Ca~itol Transit Company. 192 F. 2d. 413, 8~ 
D.C. 43 (1951). 
This so-called rule of "Abuse of Discretion" has lon1 
the established rule of law in this State. In Greco v. Gent 
88 U 255, 53 P.Zd 1155, this Court stated: 
"Motion for New Trial on ground of newly discovered 
evidence was a matter wholly within the trial court''. 
discretion as long as that discretion was not abus~ 
the Supreme Court could not interfere". (emphasis a~: 
Greco at 1156. 
If this Court should hold that the 59 (e) Motion was 
then it is urged that this Court adopt a similar standard! 
appeals from orders denying Rule 59 (e) Motions. Authority 
such a standard can be found in the case Walker v. Bank of 
National Trust & Savings Association 2 68 F.2d 16 (C.A. D 
If a motion for a new trial is denied, the order of 
may be reviewed only for manifest abuse of discretio 
Lavina v. Jamison, (9 Cir.), 230 F.Zd 909. We thicl 
follows, or at least is sufficiently analogous to a 
the conclusion that an Order denying the motion ma~ 
under Rule 59 (e) to Alter or Amend the Judgment is 
appealable, but only on the question of whether ther 
has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Walker ~ 
In the instant case, there has been no assertion~ 
Appellant that there was an abuse of discretion committed! 
District Court Judge. Examination of the Court proceed~F 
- 10 -
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District Court further leads to the conclusion that such claim 
simply cannot be made in this case. There is no evidence of the 
District Court acting without authority, for an erroneous reason, 
arbitrarily, or without justification; and in fact the trial court 
acted at all times within the proper exercise of all judicial 
discretion. Therefore, this Court should rule that if the 59 (e) 
Motion were available to the Appellant, the denial of this Motion 
is not reviewable by this Court by reason of there having been 
no claim nor any evidence of an abuse of discretion by the District 
Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant has raised several questions to be decided 
in her brief. However, the only question at issue before this 
Court is the availability of the Rule 59 (e) Motion to secure 
review of the District Court's previous ruling. 
Aggrieved parties simply should not be allowed to use the 
Rule 59 (e) Motion as an excuse to reargue an unfavorable decision 
when no new issues are asserted or raised. The Rule 59 (e) Motion 
should be allowed to be used only to do exactly as it states: to 
alter or amend a judgment, not to appeal from one. 
Aggrieved.parties cannot be allowed to continually fish 
for methods and arguments for reconsideration but should be 
required to raise all points and arguments at the time of the 
initial hearing. Thus parties cannot be allowed to continually 
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attack every judgment of the District Court. The Rules of 
Procedure were created to give finality to Judgments and A 
conduct in this case shows a clear intent to disregard tho 
Sound public policy dictates that appeals from District Ju 
are the sole province of this Court and therefore the Dist 
Court did not err in denying Appellant's Motion to Alter or 
Judgment. 
Further, even conceding that the Rule 59 (e) Motion 
availabl~ in this case, the District Court's denial oft~ 
Motion is not appealable where there was no showing or ass 
of an abuse of discretion by the District Court. 
Accordingly, this Court is urged to affirm the Dist 
Court's order in all respects. 
DATED this ~t;§_y of May, 1978. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
. Kent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and corre 
of the foregoing Brief to Lucy Billings, 352 Denver Stree 
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